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ReviewThe cognitive concept of representation plays a key role
in theories of brain information processing. However,
linking neuronal activity to representational content and
cognitive theory remains challenging. Recent studies
have characterized the representational geometry of
neural population codes by means of representational
distance matrices, enabling researchers to compare
representations across stages of processing and to test
cognitive and computational theories. Representational
geometry provides a useful intermediate level of descrip-
tion, capturing both the information represented in a
neuronal population code and the format in which it is
represented. We review recent insights gained with this
approach in perception, memory, cognition, and action.
Analyses of representational geometry can compare
representations between models and the brain, and
promise to explain brain computation as transformation
of representational similarity structure.
The representational geometry of neuronal population
codes
The concept of representation is central to the cognitive
and brain sciences. We interpret neuronal activity as
serving the function of representing content, and of trans-
forming representations of content, with the ultimate ob-
jective to produce successful behaviors. The content could
be a visual image, a sound or odor, a semantic interpreta-
tion of sensory input, a proposition, a goal, a planned
action, or a motor sequence. The representational inter-
pretation [1] provides a powerful explanatory framework
that makes it easier to understand neuronal activity in the
context of the overall function of the brain. Representation
links cognition to brain activity and enables us to build
functional theories of brain information processing [2].
Neurophysiology has long interpreted the selectivity of
neurons as serving to represent various kinds of sensory
and higher-level information. The population of neurons
within an area is thought to jointly represent the content in
what is called a neuronal population code [3]. It is the
pattern of activity across neurons that represents the
content. The many possible combinations of activity states1364-6613/$ – see front matter
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ed by this idea, recent analyses of neuronal recordings and
functional imaging data have increasingly focused on pat-
terns of activity across many neurons within a functional
region [4].
We can think of a brain region’s representation as a
multidimensional space. The dimensions of the space
correspond to the neurons, and a point corresponds to
an activity pattern (i.e., each neuron’s activity provides
the coordinate value for one of the dimensions). A visually
perceived object, for example, will correspond to a point
in the representational space of a given visual area. The
set of all possible objects (or pieces of mental content)
corresponds to a vast set of points in the space. It is the
geometry of these points that defines the nature of the
representation.
Mathematical and cognitive psychology have a long
history of investigations of representational geometry on
the basis of behavioral data [5–10]. However, the notion of
representational geometry has only more recently been
brought into the analysis of brain-activity data [11–15].
To characterize the geometry of a representation, we can
compare the brain-activity patterns representing a set of
stimuli (or, more generally, experimental conditions) to
each other. The dissimilarity of two patterns corresponds
to the distance between their points in the representation-
al space. Having measured these distances, we can con-
struct a matrix, the representational dissimilarity matrix
(RDM), in which we can look up the representational
distance (or dissimilarity) for each pair of stimuli
(Figure 1). Intuitively, the RDM tells us which distinctions
between stimuli the population code honors and which
distinctions it disregards.
Considering RDMs makes it very easy to compare differ-
ent representations (e.g., different brain regions, a region to
a computational model representation, or the same region
between different individuals or species) by just computing
the correlation between the RDMs (Box 1). Comparing
activity patterns directly, by contrast, would require us to
define the correspondence mapping between, say, voxels of
two regions, or between single neurons and the units of a
computational network model, or between voxels of the
same region in two individuals. Establishing these map-
pings can be difficult and generally requires a separate
experimental data set [16–19]. The ‘representationalTrends in Cognitive Sciences, August 2013, Vol. 17, No. 8 401
Glossary
Decoding model: model that takes brain activity patterns as input and predicts
the experimental condition (e.g., the stimulus). Significant decodability
indicates that information about the experimental condition is present in the
region. A decoder can be used to model readout of a population code and
predict the reflection of the code in downstream regions and behavior.
Encoding model: model that takes the stimulus as input and predicts brain
activity. An encoder can be used to model brain processing of the stimulus,
which gives rise to a population-code representation for a given area.
Explicit representation: neuronal representation of a stimulus property that
allows immediate readout of the property by downstream neurons. If the
property can be read out by means of a linear combination of the activities of
the neurons or by a radial basis function, the property is explicitly represented.
(For example, the category of a visual object is implicitly represented in the
retina and explicitly represented in inferior temporal cortex.)
Geometric model of similarity: model of an internal multidimensional
representational space originally devised to explain human dissimilarity
judgments and patterns of generalization from examples to novel stimuli. By
measuring brain activity patterns, we can attempt to find the neuronal
implementation of the internal representational space. In the present context,
this body of ideas is important because we can apply the concepts of similarity
and generalization to gain a functional understanding of neuronal population
codes and their transformation across stages of processing. The conceptual
function of the geometric model for understanding neuronal computation is
independent of its original goal, and its successes and limitations, as a
cognitive theory of similarity judgments and generalization behavior.
Linear readout: decoding scheme based on a weighted sum of the activities of
input neurons. Linear decoders are useful because they are realistic to fit given
limited brain-activity data and any information they reveal about the stimulus
can be thought of as explicitly represented (see above).
Multidimensional scaling: procedure by which we can arrange n items in a d-
dimensional space such that their distances in the space best reflect their
dissimilarities (by different metric or nonmetric criteria). The technique can be
used, for example, to attempt to recover the internal representational space
(which is typically assumed to be Euclidean) from dissimilarity judgments. It is
also useful for producing two-dimensional arrangements that best visualize
the distances of the items in a higher dimensional space, such as a neuronal
population code. (Note that the MDS objective to best represent the original
distances in d dimensions is distinct from the objective of principal
components analysis to find the d-dimensional linear subspace that explains
maximum variance.)
Pattern component modeling (PCM): analysis technique that decomposes the
variance of brain activity patterns associated with a set of stimuli (or
experimental conditions) into components that reflect different predefined
factors such as the stimulus category, within-category variance, and measure-
ment noise [105]. PCM can provide useful summary descriptions of the
representational geometry.
Pattern-information analysis: approach to the analysis of brain activity data in
which the activity patterns within a functional brain region are analyzed
multivariately as a population code. For example, a cortical area may be
recorded invasively with an array of electrodes or imaged by fMRI. The
responses measured with electrodes or fMRI are typically also restricted to no
more than a few hundred channels per brain region and can be viewed as a
sample of the neuronal population activity. The subsampling means that a lot
of information is lost in either case. Results should be interpreted as lower
bounds for the information actually present in a region. fMRI is also
compromised by the fact that voxels reflect neuronal activity only indirectly
through hemodynamics. The response of a voxel to increased neuronal activity
is thought to reflect a combination of subthreshold activity and neuronal firing,
averaged locally across space and time.
Population code: scheme for encoding information thought to be important to
the organism in the activity of a population of neurons. The simplest scheme
uses only the firing rates of the neurons. More complex codes also use the
information contained in the precise temporal patterns of spikes and their
relationships between neurons. For each neuron, a tuning curve describes how
the firing rate reflects particular stimulus properties. A population code for a
particular type of information is ‘good’ when it represents the information in a
format that can be read out by neurons receiving input from the population.
Moreover, a good code should be efficient in the sense of achieving the
required precision without wasting neuronal or energy resources.
Representational dissimilarity matrix (RDM): square matrix indexed horizon-
tally and vertically by the stimuli (or experimental conditions) and containing a
dissimilarity index in each cell, which compares the two brain-activity patterns
associated with stimuli labeling the row and column. An RDM provides a
useful characterization of the representational geometry (see below) for a
limited set of experimental stimuli. If the same activity pattern estimates are
used for the vertical and horizontal dimensions, the RDM is symmetric about a
diagonal of zeros. If independent pattern estimates are used for the vertical and
horizontal dimensions, the RDM contains entries comparing independent
pattern estimates for identical stimuli (reflecting measurement noise) along its
diagonal, and two alternative dissimilarity estimates for each stimulus pair in
symmetric off-diagonal positions.
Representational geometry: geometry of a set of entities represented as points
in a space spanned by the dimensions of a neuronal population code.
Representational geometry focuses on the relationships between the entities,
rather than on single entities, and on geometric properties including distances
in the high-dimensional space rather than on differences in the activity of
single neurons. Representational geometry provides a useful intermediate
level of description that helps us abstract from idiosyncrasies of individual
brains and highlights the representational properties that are key to the
computational goals of the brain.
Represented information: mutual information between stimuli and response
patterns. This comprises any differences between stimuli that can in principle
be decoded from a neuronal population code. Given limited data, we cannot fit
arbitrarily complex decoding models in practice. Thus, estimates of the
represented information are negatively biased. The data processing inequality
states that information can only be lost, never gained, along stages of
processing. The retina has all the represented information about visual stimuli
that any brain region has.
Similarity: subjective notion of the relationship between two objects that
reflects the degree to which an organism distinguishes them. Similarity is
inherently subjective, because any two non-identical objects will share some
properties and differ in other properties. Judging similarity from object
properties necessarily implies some choice and weighting of the properties. In
the interest of its survival and reproduction, an organism should regard two
objects as similar if they require the same behavioral response, for example, if
one can replace the other (positive objects) or if both pose the same danger
(negative objects). Which properties are relevant and irrelevant and how they
should be weighted depend on the individual, its current goals, and the
context. We can apply the concept of similarity not only at the level of the entire
organism but also at the level of individual brain representations. This enables
us to view neuronal computation as the stage-by-stage transformation of
population-code representational similarity, whose function is to be under-
stood in the larger context of the goals of brain information processing.
Single-neuron computational model: model that predicts the responses of a
particular neuron to arbitrary stimuli. For example, responses of primary visual
simple and complex cells can be modeled using localized linear filters of the
input image and simple nonlinearities. For higher-level brain regions such as
IT, it is currently impossible to fit single-neuron computational models. The
problem is not only that the model space is insufficiently defined, but also that
the number of parameters to be fitted (for any plausible model space) is too
large given the number of stimuli for which response data can be acquired.
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dence mappings.
A popular method for testing whether two classes of
stimuli can be discriminated in the representation is pat-
tern classifier analysis [20–27]. Classifier analysis, or
decoding, typically focuses on binary distinctions and on
revealing whether a region contains information about the
class of a stimulus. In practice, the classifier is often linear
and successful classification indicates some degree of line-
ar discriminability between the classes. The analysis of
representational geometry is complementary to classifier
analysis and goes beyond the question of discriminability
of classes (and the presence of information). Two classes of
stimuli can be discriminable for many different represen-
tational geometries (Figure 1, scenarios 2–9). However, the
particular geometry matters for the computational func-
tion of the region. Beyond the question of what information
is present (i.e., pieces of content distinctly represented) and
what information is explicit (e.g., in the sense of being
amenable to linear readout), a representation imposes a
rich structure on the domain of its content. The detailed
geometry of the representations of particular items can
reflect their similarity, their categorical divisions, and
their continuous variation along property dimensions of
behavioral significance. Items that are clustered in a re-
presentation can easily be grouped together, and their
differences abstracted from, when the code is read by other
brain regions. Representational geometry thus provides a
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Figure 1. Representational geometries and their reflection in distance matrices. (A) Illustration of ten hypothetical representational geometries for brain regions (numbered
1–10). Each dot corresponds to the representation of a particular piece of content (e.g., a visual object). The space in which the dots are placed is the space of
representational patterns (illustrated as two-dimensional, but high-dimensional in reality). The halo regions around the dots indicate the margin of error; dots with
overlapping error halos are indistinguishable. The items fall into two categories (dark or light), or in the case of geometry 10, on a continuous manifold (shades of gray). (1)
No item is distinct from any other item. (2) Most items are distinctly represented but the categories cannot be separated by any simple boundary. (3) Only the light items are
distinctly represented and they are separable from the dark items by a quadratic boundary. (4) Dark and light items are linearly separable and arranged along parallel lines
with pairs of dark and light dots matched up across the boundary. (5) The items form a single cluster but the categories are linearly separable. (6) The items form two
category clusters that are linearly separable and within which all items are distinct. (7) Like the previous case, but the items in the dark category are indistinguishable. (8)
Like the previous case, but only the category distinction is represented; items within each category are indistinguishable from each other. (9) The dark items are
indistinguishable and located among the distinctly represented light items on a circle. (10) Items fall on two manifolds that closely follow each other, with pairs of items
matched up across them. (B) Representational distance matrix for each of the ten geometries (in the corresponding panel location). Distances are color-coded from blue
(items indistinguishable) to red (items widely separated). Each matrix is indexed vertically (from the top down) and horizontally (from left to right) by the items as illustrated
in the lower left panel. Only geometry 10 (lower right) has a different item set, and the upper left quadrant corresponds to the front manifold and the lower right quadrant to
the back manifold. See Box 2 for actual brain representations exhibiting some of the geometric features illustrated here.
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marks of cognition [28]. In fact, brain computation can be
construed as the transformation of the representational
geometry along stages of processing [29].
Recent papers have reviewed results from pattern
decoding of visual representations [27] and pattern-
information methods for testing computational models
[30]. Here we give an overview of some of the insights from
recent studies of representational geometry. The next
section covers vision, the field that has been most active
with this approach. We then describe applications beyond
vision, addressing other sensory modalities, memory, cog-
nition, and action from this perspective. Finally we high-
light current challenges and future directions for studies of
representational geometry.Representational geometry in the visual system
The most rigorous account of a sensory representation is
provided by a computational model that predicts neuronal
responses to arbitrary stimuli. If we can accurately predict
the responses of all neurons in an area, we have captured
the computations up to that area. This method has been
very successful for V1 and is being extended to higher-level
cortical representations. If we could predict neuronal
responses throughout the brain, along with behavioral
output, we might not need the abstraction of representa-
tional geometry, or indeed the concept of representation.
However, even for V1, the degree to which we can predict
responses is limited [31]. Predicting neural responses
becomes more difficult as we move to higher-level regions.
The space of computational mechanisms and model403
Box 1. Representational similarity analysis
Representational similarity analysis (RSA) is pattern information
analysis that compares representational geometries between brain
regions, stimulus descriptions, conceptual and computational mod-
els, and behavioral reflections of similarity [15]. It can be applied to
functional imaging data (including fMRI, MEG, and EEG) as well as
neuronal recording data. The three basic steps (Figure I) are as
follows. (i) Choose a brain region and estimate the activity patterns.
The region can be functionally or anatomically defined. The patterns
can be estimated with standard methods used in univariate analyses.
In fMRI, for example, a linear model with a hemodynamic response
predictor for each stimulus might be used to estimate the response of
each voxel to each stimulus. For neuronal recordings, a windowed
spike count might be used. However, any other features of the
responses, such as features reflecting the temporal response
structure or energy in different frequency bands, could equally be
used to define the representation of each stimulus. (ii) Estimate the
representational dissimilarity matrix (RDM). The representation in a
given brain region or computational model is characterized by the
matrix of dissimilarities between the stimulus representations. A
popular distance measure is the correlation distance (1–Pearson
correlation across voxels, neurons, features, or model units). The
correlation distance disregards the overall activation level (spatial
mean), rendering the analysis complementary to analyses of overall
activation. Other distance measures such as the Euclidean or
Mahalanobis distance, or cross-validated measures such as the
discriminant t value or accuracy can also be used. (iii) Compare
RDMs from brains, behaviors, and models. The key step is to compare
RDMs to assess to what extent different representations are alike. We
might want to know whether a brain representation (a) reflects
stimulus properties, (b) reflects higher-level semantic properties, (c)
can be accounted for by a computational model, (d) reflects
representations in other brain regions, (e) is similar to a putative
homologous representation in another species, or (f) is reflected in
behavior, for example in similarity judgments, in stimulus confusions,
or in reaction times in discrimination tasks. One useful way to
compare RDMs is to compute the correlation between the corre-
sponding dissimilarities. The rank correlation (Spearman) is often
used for this purpose when a linear relationship between the
dissimilarities cannot be assumed (e.g., when comparing fMRI-based
RDMs to other RDMs). Statistical inference is commonly performed
by means of randomization testing (randomly permuting the stimulus
labels to simulate the null distribution of the RDM correlation) and
bootstrap techniques (to compare the relative performance of
different models). Comparing two representations at the level of
dissimilarities rather than at the level of the original patterns is a
useful trick that obviates the need for defining the correspondence
mapping between the representational units. Like classifier decoding,
RSA is a pattern information technique that is sensitive to information
encoded combinatorially in fine-grained patterns of activity. However,
rather than asking what information can be (linearly) read from the
representation, RSA attempts to characterize the representational
geometry and compare it to various models. Like encoding models
(also known as voxel or population receptive field models in the fMRI
literature [17,18,112]), RSA captures the representation of a rich set of
stimuli and aims to test computational models of brain information
processing that generalize to novel stimuli. However, rather than
comparing brains and models at the level of activity patterns
(requiring fitting of weights that define the relationship between
model units and voxels), RSA compares representations at the level of
dissimilarity matrices.
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Figure I. Representational similarity analysis. Illustration of the steps of RSA for a simple design with six visual stimuli. (A) Stimuli (or, more generally, experimental
conditions) are assumed to elicit brain representations of individual pieces of content (e.g., visual objects). Here the representation of each item is visualized as a set of
voxels (an fMRI region of interest) that are active to different degrees (black-to-red color scale). We compute the dissimilarity for each pair of stimuli, for example using
1–correlation across voxels. (B) The representational dissimilarity matrix (RDM) assembles the dissimilarities for all pairs of stimuli (blue-to-red color scale for small-to-
large dissimilarities). The matrix can be used like a table to look up the dissimilarity between any two stimuli. The RDM is typically symmetric about a diagonal of zeros
(white entries along the diagonal). RDMs can similarly be computed from stimulus descriptions (bottom left), from internal representations in computational models
(bottom right), and from behavior (top right). By correlating RDMs (black double arrows), we can then assess to what extent the brain representation reflects stimulus
properties, can be accounted for by different computational models, and is reflected in behavior.
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Review Trends in Cognitive Sciences August 2013, Vol. 17, No. 8parameters becomes very complex, making it hard to
consider all plausible models and to adjudicate between
them with the limited amounts of data we can acquire. It is
useful therefore to first seek a more abstract descriptive
characterization of the population code for each area.
Analyses of representational geometry have brought
insights into all stages of visual representation, from early
visual areas to high-level object representations in the
ventral stream.
For example, Hegde´ and Van Essen found that consid-
ering the population representational geometry revealed
clearer distinctions between early visual areas than sin-
gle-cell selectivity measures [32]. Neuronal population
response patterns elicited by symbols and visual patterns
showed clustering according to complexity categories in
V2 and V4, but not in V1 (Figure 2A). Freeman et al. found
a clear distinction between V1 and V2 when investigating
the representation of natural textures [33]. V2 neuronalV1 V2
LO
Monkey
behavior
(A) (B)
(C) (D) 
IT
neurons
Figure 2. Representational geometries visualized by arranging the stimuli in two dime
distances that characterize a representation is to arrange the stimuli in two dimensions. 
such that stimuli eliciting similar response patterns are placed together and stimuli 
investigated early visual neuronal population representations of grayscale symbols an
formed in V2. Reproduced, with permission, from [32]. (B) Brouwer and Heeger fou
(connection lines) in V4, but not in V1, despite high within-color clustering in V1, ind
Reproduced, with permission, from [38]. (C) Op de Beeck et al. studied the represen
reflection in the animals’ behavioral judgments [13]. Shape parameters were smoothl
whose independently performed multidimensional scaling (MDS) arrangements are s
Edelman et al. investigated the representation of shaded renderings of 3D models of an
fMRI activity patterns in lateral occipital (LO) cortex reflected categorical divisions.
representation of face and house images along stages of the ventral stream [15,63]. The
all physically dissimilar images; the fusiform face area discriminated the two categorie
individual faces. Reproduced, with permission, from [15,63]. The arrangements in all pa
(B), where the space spanned by the first two principal components is shown.representational distances better reflected perceived
texture similarities [34]. Human functional magnetic
resonance imaging (fMRI) has suggested that the per-
ceived similarity of natural textures, including metal,
wood, glass, and fur, is best reflected in the representa-
tional geometry of higher ventral-stream regions (Box 2,
Figure IB) [35]. Whereas V1 may represent local Fourier
statistics, V2 and higher regions might compute higher-
order statistics of V1 outputs, which are more predictive
of the perceptual quality of a texture (Box 2, Figure IG)
[36,37].
The transformation from a low-level feature representa-
tion to a representation that reflects perceptual qualities is a
common theme among studies of representational geome-
try. In the domain of color, a human fMRI study [38] showed
that the representational geometry in V4, but not V1–3,
reflects perceptual color space, although color decoding was
most accurate in V1 (Figure 2B). This illustrates the need toSimilarity
judgments
V1 V4
alT
EVC FFA
p< 0.010.05
(E)
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nsions. An intuitive way of jointly visualizing the many pairwise high-dimensional
This figure shows the stimuli presented in four studies (panels A–D) arranged in 2D
eliciting different response patterns are placed apart. (A) Hegde´ and Van Essen
d patterns [32]. The stimuli are colored here according to the three clusters they
nd that the representation of colors (as shown) reflects perceptual color space
icating color decodability [38]. Analyses were based on fMRI response patterns.
tation of parameterized shapes in monkey inferior temporal (IT) neurons and its
y reflected in both the IT representation (gray) and behavioral judgments (black),
uperimposed here for comparison. Reproduced, with permission, from [13]. (D)
imals and vehicles in human visual cortex with fMRI [11]. Similarity judgments and
 Reproduced, with permission, from [11]. (E) Kriegeskorte et al. examined the
 fMRI patterns from early visual cortex (EVC) significantly discriminated (red lines)
s; and an anterior IT (aIT) face-identity region discriminated the physically similar
nels were computed from the response pattern dissimilarities by MDS, except for
405
Box 2. Representational geometries in recent studies
Inspection of the representational dissimilarity matrices (RDMs) that
characterize brain regions, various models, and behavioral data is an
important exploratory process that can reveal interesting and
unexpected representational structure. Here we consider RDMs from
a wide range of recent studies. Note that prior hypotheses and
statistical inference, as reported in the original papers, are required to
support any theoretical conclusions. (A) RDMs for human IT and
explicit behavioral dissimilarity judgments reveal related yet distinct
structures. Both IT and judgments emphasize animate/inanimate and
face/body divisions. However, the judgments additionally emphasize
human/nonhuman and man-made/natural divisions [54]. Note that
the categorical structure is obvious only because the stimuli are
ordered by category. In contrast to 2D arrangements by representa-
tional dissimilarity (see Figure 2 in main text), which do not depend
on any choice of stimulus order, the appearance of an RDM depends
on the order chosen for display. (B) The early visual representation of
natural textures, including metal, ceramic, and glass, resembles a
model based on low-level image features. The representation in the
fusiform gyrus is distinct from the early visual representation and
more consistent with human perceptual similarity ratings [35]. (C)
RDMs from neuronal recordings in macaque middle and anterior face
patches illustrate the transformation of representational geometry
across stages of processing. Neuronal population response patterns
cluster by face view in the middle face patches (left RDM). The blocks
of similar patterns correspond to faces of different identities in the
same view. By contrast, the anterior face patch (right RDM) exhibits
strong view tolerance and selectivity for individual identities. Each
identity elicited similar response patterns when presented in different
views (subtle dark diagonal lines) [67]. (D) Images of animals from six
biological species are represented distinctly in early visual and lateral
occipital cortex. The early visual RDM resembles that from a
computational model of V1. The lateral occipital RDM resembles
judgments of biological similarity, which reflect the categories
(insects, birds, primates) [53]. (E) An RDM model of gaze direction
is contrasted with two competing models: a low-level model of
physical stimulus features and a categorical model of gaze direction
relative to the observer. Searchlight representational similarity
analysis (not shown) revealed that anterior STS might represent gaze
direction with tolerance to head view [80]. (F) RDM of whole-brain
activity patterns during pain perception and other mental states. The
RDM reveals the similarity in terms of global brain activity of eight
mental states, suggesting shared recruitment of specialized brain
regions in pain, emotion, interoception, and reward [113]. Yarkoni et
al. have presented a comprehensive meta-analytical framework for
analyzing the discriminability of mental states from whole-brain
activity patterns [114]. Note that the representational interpretation
appears less natural for whole-brain patterns reflecting various kinds
of task processing than for the localized representations in the other
studies discussed here. However, similar caveats apply at both levels
of analysis. (G) The RDM for a set of natural images (based on spatial
human EEG patterns 101 ms after stimulus onset) is substantially
correlated with an RDM predicted by a model of spatially pooled
image-contrast statistics, namely the parameters of a Weibull fit to the
distribution of local contrast measurements [37].
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Figure I. Representational dissimilarity matrices in recent studies. (A) RDM from fMRI patterns in human IT and RDM based on human dissimilarity judgments.
Reproduced, with permission, from [54]. (B) RDMs from fMRI responses to natural visual textures from a model of low-level image statistics and from human similarity
ratings. Reproduced, with permission, from [35]. (C) RDMs from neuronal recordings for monkey middle face patches (middle lateral and middle fundus, 121 neurons)
and anterior face patch (anterior medial, 158 neurons). The stimuli are faces of different identities and views. One photograph per view labels a set of rows and columns
for different identities in that view. Reproduced, with permission, from [67]. (D) RDMs from fMRI responses to images of animals from six species in three biological
categories and from a computational model of V1 and subject judgments of biological similarity. Reproduced, with permission, from [53]. (E) RDMs for three different
models of representation of faces and eye positions: model 1, by gaze direction; model 2, by head view (ignoring eyes); and model 3, by gaze categories relative to the
observer (direct/eye contact, left, right). Reproduced, with permission, from [80]. (F) Whole-brain activity pattern dissimilarities between different functional states.
Global patterns were estimated meta-analytically. Reproduced, with permission, from [113]. (G) RDMs based on spatial patterns of human event-related-potential
amplitudes evoked by natural Images 101 ms after stimulus onset (top) and a model based on parameters of a Weibull fit to the spatially pooled distribution of local
contrast measurements (bottom). Reproduced, with permission, from [37].
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Review Trends in Cognitive Sciences August 2013, Vol. 17, No. 8reveal not only what information is present in a region but
also its representational geometry to understand the neural
basis of perception.
Whereas textures and colors make the ‘stuff’ of vision, a
major function of the ventral stream is the visual recognition
of ‘things’ [39]. Ventral-stream representational geometry
has been investigated using abstract parameterized shapes,
which serve as a stepping stone towards real-world object
images. Op de Beeck et al. found that the parameters of a
simple 2D shape space were reflected in the representation-
al geometry in monkey inferior temporal (IT) and in percep-
tual judgments of monkeys and humans (Figure 2C) [13].
Human fMRI studies similarly support a representation of
shape reflecting perception in lateral occipital complex
(LOC) [40], with the anterior LOC reflecting perceptual
similarities most strongly [41] and lateral LOC tuned to
smaller features [42]. More complex 3D shape parameter-
izations have also been successfully used to model IT single-
neuron responses [43], suggesting that IT represents
3D shape.
Parameterized shapes afford good experimental control,
but they lack naturalism and behavioral relevance. This has
motivated the use of real-world photos depicting faces,
people, animals, objects, and scenes. Several studies using
photos suggest that ventral-stream regions do not merely
represent objects in a continuous space of high-level visual
features, but emphasize categorical boundaries and seman-
tic dimensions of the visual images in humans [11,20,44,45]
(Figure 2D) and monkeys [46]. Both the categorical divisions
and the within-category representational geometry are
strikingly similar between monkey IT and human ven-
tral–temporal object-sensitive cortex [45]. Beyond the pres-
ence of category information [20], several studies suggest
that response patterns elicited by images of the same cate-
gory form clusters in ventral–temporal response-pattern
space [11,45,46]. The major categorical divisions are be-
tween animates and inanimates [45–48] and between faces
and bodies. Such clustering was not observed in early visual
representations or computational visual features of a range
of complexities [45], suggesting that the clusters do not
simply reflect visual feature similarity. Instead, the ventral
temporal code might be optimized to emphasize behavioral-
ly relevant categorical divisions and semantic dimensions
[44–49]. The geometric centrality of an object in the repre-
sentation has been linked to the perception of typicality [49].
Animates appear to form a representational cluster not only
in IT but also in the amygdala [50]. The representation
appears to be sensitive to the dimension of animacy, even
when comparing real faces and physically similar manne-
quin faces [51], strengthening the case for a semantic com-
ponent to the code. The animate–inanimate division is
associated with a large-scale lateral-to-medial gradient in
ventral temporal cortex, which is unaltered in congenitally
blind individuals [52], suggesting that it does not require
visual experience to develop. Finer categorical divisions
within animates have also been observed in monkeys [46]
and humans (Box 2, Figure ID) [53].
Human ventral–temporal representational distances
closely match human dissimilarity judgments [11,40,
41,54], which exhibit the same major categorical divisions
and a similar within-category structure. However, humanjudgments transcend the ventral–temporal representation
in that they additionally emphasize the division between
human and non-human animals and that between man-
made and natural objects, which are not very pronounced in
the ventral stream (Box 2, Figure IA) [54].
Places [55] and faces [56] are thought to have special
behavioral relevance and specialized cortical regions ded-
icated to their analysis. Several studies have attempted to
characterize the representational geometry of these
regions. Walther et al. found that natural scenes pre-
sented as either photographs or line drawings could be
decoded from V1, the parahippocampal place area (PPA),
retrosplenial cortex (RSC), and LOC [57–59]. However,
only in the higher visual regions did pattern dissimila-
rities predict behavioral confusions. Kravitz et al. com-
pared the representational geometry of scenes in early
visual cortex and PPA and found that early visual repre-
sentation strongly reflected the distance of the perceived
scene (near vs far), whereas PPA represented whether
scenes were closed or open [60]. A comparison of the
representational geometries of LOC, RSC, and PPA sug-
gested that LOC represents the objects present in the
scene and RSC the global spatial layout, and PPA com-
bines information about both of these components of
scenes [61]. Morgan et al. found that geographic distances
between landmarks of a college campus were reflected in
hippocampal responses when subjects familiar with the
location of the landmarks viewed them in a scanner [62].
The hippocampus responded more strongly to changes
spanning a greater physical distance. However, re-
sponse-pattern dissimilarity was not significantly corre-
lated with physical distance anywhere in the brain.
Studies of face-specific representations in humans have
suggested that the fusiform face area (FFA) [56] emphasizes
the distinction between faces and non-faces, whereas ante-
rior temporal cortex discriminates individual faces
(Figure 2E) [63–65]. However, individual-level face infor-
mation has also been observed in the FFA and other regions
[64–66]. The best demonstration of the transformation of
face representational geometry across face regions comes
from fMRI-targeted neuronal recordings in monkeys (Box 2,
Figure IC) [67]. The representation of identities was view-
specific in the middle face patches (ML and MF), partially
view-tolerant in anterior face patch (AL), with mirror-sym-
metric views co-localized in the representational space, and
almost view-invariant in the most anterior face patch (AM).
A mirror-symmetric representation of face views has also
been observed in humans [68]. Many higher visual areas,
including LOC, occipital face area (OFA), FFA, PPA, and
dorsal regions, showed a mirror-symmetric response to
faces. For example, views of –608 and 608 elicited similar
response patterns, suggesting pooling of mirror-symmetric
lower-level features as a computational step towards great-
er tolerance to view changes.
Achieving tolerance to stimulus variations that are not
relevant to a given task such as face identification is one of
the central challenges of object recognition [69]. Although
ventral-stream representations are not fully invariant [70]
to the view, position, or scale of an object, they support
linear readout with some robustness to these accidental
properties [71]. To understand how tolerance is achieved,407
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al geometries of V4 and IT on the basis of neuronal
recordings in monkeys [72]. Both regions discriminated
individual images and their scrambled counterparts. IT
exhibited reduced information about scrambled images,
but increased generalization for intact images across posi-
tion and context clutter. This suggests a transformation of
representational geometry in which position and clutter
are de-emphasized relative to the presence of complex
feature conjunctions diagnostic of differences between re-
al-world objects.
A special case of clutter is the presence of additional
objects in the image. Several studies have investigated
ventral temporal response patterns to multiple simulta-
neously presented objects in monkeys [73] and humans
[74–76]. Results suggest that the response pattern elicited
by multiple objects is well predicted by the average of the
response patterns [73]. If one of the objects is attended, this
object receives a greater weight in the average [75]. These
results are broadly consistent with biased competition and
with the divisive normalization model [77], in which the
summed neural population response to multiple inputs is
held constant through recurrent suppression.
As we observe people in the real world, we do not just
recognize them. We infer a host of socially important pieces
of information. Facial expressions of emotion appear to be
represented in posterior STS with the representational
geometry reflected in similarity judgments of the expres-
sions [78]. It has been suggested that the STS and medial
prefrontal regions represent perceived emotions with in-
variance to the sensory source (dynamic faces, bodies, or
voices, [79]). Another socially important feature of faces is
gaze direction. Displacement of the dark iris and pupil
provides a subtle but socially important indication of where
someone is looking. Carlin et al. reported a representation
of gaze direction in right anterior STS that was tolerant to
changes in both head view and physical image features
(Box 2, Figure IE) [80].
Visual representations are not merely perceptual but
are also involved in mental imagery in the absence of visual
input. A number of human fMRI studies have investigated
brain representations during visual imagery and their
relationship to perceptual representation. Results support
the idea that imagery and perception of the same visual
content might be represented in the same cortical regions
and in a similar representational format [81–83].
Overall, studies of the geometry of visual representations
have impressively documented the stage-wise transforma-
tion of the retinal image from low-level representations of
local physical features to high-level holistic representations
of objects, faces, and scenes that better reflect perceptual
qualities, emphasizing behaviorally important categories
and semantic dimensions and deemphasizing accidental
and behaviorally irrelevant variation of the visual input.
Further studies are needed to reveal the full computational
mechanism giving rise to these transformations.
Representational geometry beyond vision
Auditory perception
Like vision, audition requires substantial tolerance to
accidental variations of the signals to be recognized. The408imposition of categorical boundaries on a fundamentally
continuous space of stimuli is another shared feature
between the two modalities. Recent studies have investi-
gated the representation of sound categories [84,85]. Gior-
dano et al. investigated the representation of natural
environmental sounds and reported that representational
geometry in the planum temporale emphasized particular
categorical distinctions more strongly than predicted by
low-level feature models [84]. The categories were living/
non-living and human/non-human, which are highly be-
haviorally relevant divisions similar to those emphasized
in ventral visual representations.
The clearest examples of categorical representation
might be expected in the domain of human language.
Speech percepts are categorical not only at the level of
conceptual and semantic content but also at the phonetic
level. A well-known example is the categorical perception
of phonemes. A recent study used human intracranial
electrode arrays to investigate the representational ge-
ometry of a continuum of artificial speech sounds ranging
from ‘ba’ through ‘da’ to ‘ga’ [86]. Response patterns in
posterior superior temporal gyrus formed clear clusters
corresponding to phonemes, despite the fact that the
sound continuum was sampled in acoustically equal
steps. Pattern dissimilarity emerged rapidly over time,
peaking at the same time (110 ms) as the evoked
potentials. A human fMRI study investigated represen-
tations of the phonemes /la/ and /ra/ in native speakers of
English and Japanese [87]. The representational dissim-
ilarity between /la/ and /ra/ phonemes in the right pri-
mary auditory cortex, but not the overall activation,
predicted the extent to which speakers were able to
discriminate between the two phonemes between, and
even within the two groups.
Beyond vision and audition, a close link between repre-
sentational geometry and perception has also been ob-
served for olfactory stimuli. Behavioral similarity ratings
for smells correlated with neural pattern representational
similarities in the posterior piriform cortex [88]. Across
several sensory modalities, studies of representational
geometry have demonstrated that brain representations
emphasize behaviorally relevant categorical distinctions
and predict perceptual similarities.
Memory
Recent studies have begun to investigate representations
of particular items during memory encoding and retrieval,
and how the precision of representational reinstatement
during encoding and retrieval predicts the success or fail-
ure of these memory operations. Polyn et al. showed that
the category-specific patterns arising during encoding of
faces, locations, and objects are reinstated in a subsequent
free-recall phase [89]. Activity patterns during free recall
predicted the category about to be recalled several seconds
in advance.
A more recent study by Xue et al. investigated the
encoding process and found that more precise perceptual
reinstatement of representations during encoding pre-
dicted better memory [90]. Interestingly, the precision of
perceptual reinstatement of representations has also been
associated with conscious representation [91]. Subsequent
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which activity patterns in the hippocampus and other
medial temporal regions have distinct signatures that
predict successful encoding [92] and retrieval [93,94].
In the studies described so far, memory served as a
storage facility, but the structure of the representational
categories was never manipulated. A recent study associ-
ated particular exemplars from each category with a shock
[95]. This led to emergence in the frontoparietal represen-
tation of a new categorical division between the shock-
associated and other images. Moreover, the patterns dur-
ing fear learning predicted the long-term behavioral ex-
pression of fear memories [96].
In sum, studies of representational geometry are
beginning to reveal how the perceptual representation
of an individual piece of content affects its mnemonic
encoding and how reinstatement of the representation
during recall enables successful recollection. We are
also beginning to elucidate the specific roles of the hip-
pocampus and other medial temporal regions and the
plasticity of the representational space itself, including
the formation of new behaviorally relevant categorical
divisions.
Action and motor control
We should be able to characterize representations along
the entire perception–action cycle by their representa-
tional geometry. The primary motor representation is a
classic example of a population code [97]. We focus here
on two recent studies that explored the geometry of motor
representations. Wiestler et al. studied the representa-
tion of finger movements and sensations in the cerebel-
lum [98], a structure thought to relate sensory and motor
representations for smooth sensorimotor control. They
compared cerebellar regions to cortical areas M1 and S1.
Cerebellar and cortical representations both discriminat-
ed movements of different individual fingers. Both also
discriminated sensations in different individual fingers.
For a given finger, movement and sensation were associ-
ated with similar patterns in M1 and S1. In the cerebel-
lum, however, the representations were not consistent
between movement and sensation, with motor and sen-
sory finger representations apparently randomly inter-
digitated. This arrangement may enable the cerebellum
to associate movements and their sensory consequences
in flexible ways, a requirement in learning new motor
tasks. In another study, Diedrichsen et al. investigated
co-localized motor representations of our two hands,
which might serve to coordinate the hands during biman-
ual tasks [99]. Representations of unimanual finger
movements were represented mostly in contralateral
M1 and S1, with a faint echo of a symmetric representa-
tion in ipsilateral areas. Such an arrangement might
facilitate symmetric bimanual movements. In premotor
and parietal areas, unimanual movements also had an
ipsilateral representation. However, it was not a sym-
metric echo, but qualitatively different. Such a co-local-
ized representation of both hands might serve to
associate the movements of the two hands in flexible
ways to coordinate the hands during asymmetric biman-
ual tasks.Current challenges for investigations of
representational geometry
Testing many models: a simultaneously hypothesis- and
data-driven approach
Many studies have focused on one or two models of repre-
sentation. In the visual domain, this could be a particular
computational model, such as a Gabor filter model, a
parameterized shape model, a semantic model, or a behav-
ioral characterization of the representational geometry.
The field is in an early phase in which finding that a model
explains significant variance (of neuronal or voxel
responses or response pattern dissimilarities) is consid-
ered an advance. This is a low bar. The theoretical advance
is not always substantial, because a great number of
qualitatively different models may capture some compo-
nent of the representation. For theoretical progress, we
need statistical model comparisons along with estimates of
the amount of non-noise variance left unexplained by each
model. Ideally, we would like to cover the entire space of
models that have not yet been strictly eliminated. Realis-
tically, we may want to focus on a range of models that are
qualitatively different in a single study. These should
include models for which we have strong predictions (so
as to put current opinion to the test) and models for which
we have no strong predictions (to go beyond the state of the
literature and advance theory). In fMRI studies, we can
test our models in a variety of regions of interest or
continuously throughout the measured volume using a
searchlight approach [100]. Such more exploratory analy-
ses represent another major source of important informa-
tion. We can combine exploration and confirmation in a
single study using multiple-testing correction and cross-
validation.
Testing of a wide range of well-motivated models
in multiple brain regions constitutes an approach that
is simultaneously strongly hypothesis- and strongly
data-driven [15,101]. This is the kind of approach we
need to bridge the divide between modeling and experi-
mental approaches, and to richly constrain brain theory
with empirical data. We must resist two temptations: (i)
to shy away from disconfirmation of prevailing bias and
(ii) to restrict our analyses to be able to tell a better
‘story’. A story that crumbles upon consideration of a
broader view of the available evidence (i.e., more com-
prehensive analyses of our own data) is clearly not worth
telling.
Engaging temporal dynamics
Representations are inherently dynamic, emerging over
time as evidence from the sensory stream accumulates or
recurrent computations converge on an interpretation of
the input. At the level of higher cognition, thoughts emerge
dynamically through the interplay of perception, long-term
memory associations, and the current contents of working
memory. Representational dynamics can be investigated
by analyzing the representational geometry with a tempo-
ral sliding window. Recent studies have begun to move in
this direction, using sliding-window decoding techniques
for neuronal recordings [71] and human magnetoencepha-
lography (MEG) [102–104] and electroencephalography
(EEG) data [37].409
Box 3. Outstanding questions
 How are representational geometries transformed across stages
of processing in vision and other modalities?
 How do perceptual representational geometries emerge over tens
and hundreds of milliseconds as sensory information accumulates
and recurrent computations converge?
 How do learning and expertise affect representational geometry?
 What aspects of behavior can we predict from the representational
geometry at different stages of the perception-to-action cycle?
 Can representational geometries explain unique aspects of an
individual’s mind and behavior?
 Are impairments of perception and cognition in mental illness
associated with atypical representational geometries? Can repre-
sentational geometries be tracked over time to characterize the
course of an illness and the effect of therapeutic interventions?
 What multivariate distance is best suited for measuring represen-
tational dissimilarities in neuronal or fMRI data?
 What mathematical concepts of topology and geometry might be
useful for understanding neuronal population codes (e.g., non-
Euclidean or nonmetric geometries)?
 How can neuronal coding theory best be brought to bear on
analyses of representational geometry?
 The geometric model of similarity judgments and generalization
behavior can help us understand neuronal population codes. Does
the same hold true for feature-, analogy-, and transformation-
based similarity models?
 What form of statistical inference best enables us to adjudicate
between competing models that explain representational
geometry?
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We might seek improvements to the approach of compar-
ing representations by the rank correlation between their
distance matrices. This approach does not require the
(often questionable) assumption of a linear relationship
between the distances, and deals gracefully with the fact
that distances estimated from noisy pattern estimates are
generally positively biased. However, it also discards po-
tentially important geometric information. A promising
complementary approach to comparing representations
based on noisy data is pattern component modeling, in
which the pattern variance is decomposed into compo-
nents that correspond to experimental factors and noise
[105].
Analysis of representational dissimilarity matrices is
one important tool for understanding representational
geometry. However, linear decoding remains useful as a
straightforward test of linear separability (a particular
feature of the representational geometry) and of the degree
to which the linear decision boundary generalizes to dif-
ferent stimuli. Nonlinear decoders based on quadratic
boundaries or radial basis functions [106] similarly reveal
information that is available for immediate readout and
might thus be considered explicit in the code, just like
information available for linear readout. We will need a
repertoire of specific models to test for a range of computa-
tionally relevant properties of the representational geom-
etry.
Considering different population codes and
representational distance measures
Current studies have largely defined representations as
spatial activity patterns (e.g., from fMRI or windowed
spike counts), with the activity level in each voxel or
neuron contributing one dimension to the space. However,
population coding theory has explored a much wider range
of possible codes, including temporal codes. For example,
the representational dissimilarity of two stimuli could be
measured by comparing the temporal order in which neu-
rons fire their first spike in response to the stimulus [107]
or relative to the Gamma cycle [108]. Another approach
would be to use spatiotemporal or time–frequency patterns
to define the representational space. In addition, a range of
distance measures based on neuronal population spike
trains deserves to be explored [109].
Investigating plasticity and individual differences
One of the challenges in understanding the brain (or the
mind) is that it is not a unitary object. Everyone is differ-
ent, and our brains are continually plastic. If we are to
understand the mind or the brain, we must be interested in
interindividual variation and plasticity. Several studies
suggest that the neural representation of visual stimuli is
largely shared across people [19,110,111]. Future work
should elucidate how representational geometries are
transformed through experience and whether, in addition
to the component of the representation that is shared
between individuals, there is a replicable individually
unique component that can explain a person’s unique
perception and behavior.410Concluding remarks
The study of representational geometry has provided novel
insights into such diverse domains as vision and audition,
categorical perception, memory encoding and recall, emo-
tion, motor control, and higher cognitive processes including
conscious awareness. Representational geometry can serve
as a hub that enables us to connect experiment and theory at
the crucial intermediate level of description, where compu-
tational network models meet massively multivariate data
from electrophysiological population recordings and high-
resolution functional imaging. Moreover, representational
geometries can be compared between stages of processing,
between model and brain representations, between individ-
uals and species, and between brain and behavior. Many
outstanding questions remain (Box 3). Future studies
should systematically test wider ranges of models, including
computational models, better integrate population-coding
theory, reveal the representational dynamics, and elucidate
representational plasticity and the individually unique com-
ponent of representational geometries.
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